博弈论
    Game Theory

  • 讲   师:

    • 本·波拉克
  • 译   者:

    atlayao, 小飞鱼, blue7blur, tamour1989, 薛丁格的猫, Alive, JJPP, Jarszm, 百年孤独, henryzz, fox_liline, 云天, 哲哲任, 最时光, 科学怪蜀黍, tyz1943jay

  • 学   校:

    耶鲁大学

  • 来   源:

    人人影视

  • 语   言:

    中英

  • 免费

  • 试    读
  • 导学
  • 博弈论是对战略决策的研究。更正式的讲,它是“对冲突的数学模型以及明智、理性的决策者之间的合作的研究”。这一话题首先会讲解零和理论,即一个人的所得和其他参加者(们)的净亏损完全吻合。然而今天博弈论广泛应用于阶级关系的分析中,并发展成了一种科学的逻辑面的涵盖性术语,包括人类和如电脑之类的非人类。

    Game theory is the study of strategic decision making. More formally, it is "the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers". The subject first addressed zero-sum games, such that one person's gains exactly equal net losses of the other participant(s). Today, however, game theory applies to a wide range of class relations, and has developed into an umbrella term for the logical side of science, to include both human and non-humans, like computers.

  • 课程简介
  • 这门课程系统介绍了博弈论和战略思维,讨论了支配思想、落后的感应、纳什均衡、进化稳定性、承诺,信誉,信息不对称等热点科学话题背后的博弈模型、概念,并会把这些概念应用于课上游戏及经济、政治、电影和其他方面案例的分析中。有助于读者提高科学判断局势、理性选择的能力。

    This course is an introduction to game theory and strategic thinking. Ideas such as dominance, backward induction, Nash equilibrium, evolutionary stability, commitment, credibility, asymmetric information, adverse selection, and signaling are discussed and applied to games played in class and to examples drawn from economics, politics, the movies, and elsewhere.

  • 讲师简介
  • 本·波拉克是耶鲁大学经济系和管理学院的经济和管理教授。他在剑桥大学三一学院获得文学学士学位,在西北大学获得硕士学位,在哈佛大学获得博士学位。他是微观经济理论和经济史方面的专家。

    Ben Polak is Professor of Economics and Management in the Department of Economics and the School of Management at Yale University. He received his B.A. from Trinity College, Cambridge University, his M.A. from Northwestern University, and his Ph.D. from Harvard University. A specialist in microeconomic theory and economic history.

  • 目录
    • 第1讲 导论-五个入门结论
    • 第2讲 学会换位思考
    • 第3讲 迭代剔除和中位选民定理
    • 第4讲 足球比赛与商业合作之最佳对策
    • 第5讲 纳什均衡之坏风气与银行挤兑
    • 第6讲 纳什均衡之约会游戏与古诺模型
    • 第7讲 纳什均衡伯川德模型与选民投票
    • 第8讲 立场选择种族隔离与策略随机化
    • 第9讲 混合策略及其在网球比赛中的应用
    • 第10讲 混合战略棒球,约会和支付您的税
    • 第11讲 合作,突变,与平衡
    • 第12讲 社会公约,侵略,和周期
    • 第13讲 道德风险,奖励,和饥饿的狮子
    • 第14讲 承诺,间谍,和先行者优势
    • 第15讲 国际象棋,战略和可信的威胁
    • 第16讲 声誉和决斗
    • 第17讲 最后通牒和讨价还价
    • 第18讲 信息集和子博弈完美
    • 第19讲 招商引资和战略投资
    • 第20讲 战争的消耗
    • 第21讲 合作与结局
    • 第22讲 作弊,惩罚和外包
    • 第23讲 沉默,信令和苦难教育
    • 第24讲 拍卖和获奖者的诅咒
    • Lecture 1 Introduction: Five First Lessons
    • Lecture 2 Putting Yourselves into Other People's Shoes
    • Lecture 3 Iterative Deletion and the Median-Voter Theorem
    • Lecture 4 Best Responses in Soccer and Business Partnerships
    • Lecture 5 Nash Equilibrium: Bad Fashion and Bank Runs
    • Lecture 6 Nash Equilibrium: Dating and Cournot
    • Lecture 7 Nash Equilibrium: Shopping, Standing and Voting on a Line
    • Lecture 8 Nash Equilibrium: Location, Segregation and Randomization
    • Lecture 9 Mixed Strategies in Theory and Tennis
    • Lecture 10 Mixed Strategies in Baseball, Dating and Paying Your Taxes
    • Lecture 11 Evolutionary Stability Cooperation, Mutation, and Equilibrium
    • Lecture 12 Evolutionary Stability Social Convention, Aggression, and Cycles
    • Lecture 13 Sequential Games Moral Hazard, Incentives, and Hungry Lions
    • Lecture 14 Backward Induction Commitment, Spies, and First-Mover Advantages
    • Lecture 15 Backward Induction Chess, Strategies, and Credible Threats
    • Lecture 16 Backward Induction Reputation and Duels
    • Lecture 17 Backward Induction Ultimatums and Bargaining
    • Lecture 18 Imperfect Information: Information Sets and Sub-Game Perfection
    • Lecture 19 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Matchmaking and Strategic Investments
    • Lecture 20 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Wars of Attrition
    • Lecture 21 Repeated Games Cooperation vs. the End Game
    • Lecture 22 Repeated Games: Cheating, Punishment, and Outsourcing
    • Lecture 23 Asymmetric Information Silence, Signaling and Suffering Education
    • Lecture 24 Asymmetric Information Auctions and the Winner's Curse
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