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Our inferences regarding matters of fact are ultimately based in probability. If experience teaches us that two events are conjoined quite frequently, the mind will infer a strong causal link between them. All meaningful terms, Hume asserts, must be reducible to the simple impressions from which they are built up. Since there is no simple impression of cause and effect or of necessary connection, these terms might appear meaningless. Rather than condemn them entirely, Hume simply reduces their scope, suggesting that there is nothing in them that goes beyond an observation of constant conjunction between two events. Hume turns these conclusions toward a compatibilist view of free will and determinism. If we perceive no necessary connection between events, we needn't worry that all our actions are causally predetermined. Rather than view free will as the freedom to have done otherwise, we should view it as the freedom to act according to one's own determinations, which is true of everyone but prisoners. Near the end of the Enquiry, Hume follows a number of tangential discussions, arguing that human and animal reason are analogous, that there is no rational justification for a belief in miracles nor for the more speculative forms of religious and metaphysical philosophy. While a skepticism regarding necessary connection and the existence of an external world is justified, it destroys our ability to act or judge. The instinctual beliefs formed by custom help us get by in the world and think prudently. As long as we restrict our thinking to relations of ideas and matters of fact, we should be fine, but we should abandon all metaphysical speculations as superfluous and nonsensical.