好文分享：理性的歪曲
Rationality has been a popular topic of discussion for many years. There is a huge body of literature, popular and scholarly, that addresses rational thinking skills. It seems as if everyone has an opinion on rationality. Rationality is often misunderstood, and the word loses its importance when it is defined in terms so broad or ambiguous that it can mean virtually anything. This confusion has contributed to myths concerning rationality.
很多年来，合理性（rationality）这一话题一直为人们所热议。有关这一话题的文献——不管是大众的还是学术的——已是汗牛充栋，它们阐述了训练合理性思维（Rational thinking）的各种技巧。如今，每一个人似乎各自都有对合理性的理解。然而，这一概念总是会被人曲解，而当描述这一概念所使用的术语太过宽泛，又或者是模棱两可以至于它可以代表任何意义时，这个词语就失去了它的重要性，而这种混乱，造成的后果是对合理性这一概念的歪曲。
In a recent interview I asked cognitive scientist Keith Stanovich:
在最近的一次采访当中，我向认知科学家基思·斯坦诺维西（Keith Stanovich）询问：
What are the two most common myths about rationality? I am aware there are more than a few, but if you were limited to discussing two, what would they be and how do we combat these erroneous thoughts?
对合理性的歪曲最常见的形式是哪两种？我明白这种歪曲俯拾即是，但如果我们将探讨限定于其中两种的话会是什么。同时，我们应该如何对抗这些错误的观点。
Here is Dr. Stanovich’s answer:
以下是斯坦诺维西博士的回答：
I discuss many of these in all my books, but most specifically at the beginning of my book Decision Making and Rationality in the Modern World (Oxford University Press). There, I discussed two common misconceptions about rational thinking:
在所有的著作当中，我有许多关于这些歪曲的阐述，但最具体的是在《现代世界之决策与合理性》（牛津大学出版社）这部著作的开头部分。在那里，我论述了两种对合理性思维的误解。
1. That there is not much more to rational thinking than logical thinking
1、合理性思维与逻辑思维（logic thinking）相较并无特别取长之处。
2. That emotions are inherently irrational
2、情绪本质上是不合理的。
Here is the essence of the point—intertwining these two issues. In my books, I argue that rationality is one of the most important human values. It is important for a person’s happiness and well being that they think and act rationally. The high status accorded rationality in my books may seem at odds with other characterizations that deem rationality either trivial (little more than the ability to solve textbook-type logic problems) or in fact antithetical to human fulfillment (as an impairment to an enjoyable emotional life, for instance). These ideas about rationality derive from a restricted and mistaken view of rational thought — one not in accord with the study of rationality in modern cognitive science.
这是问题的关键——将这两个问题交缠在一起。在我的著作当中，我认为合理性是人类最重要的价值之一。思考与行为都遵循合理的原则，这对于一个人的幸福与康乐至为重要。我在这本书中赋予这个概念以极高的地位，这或许与其他人所作的描述相左。这些描述要么认为合理性思维没有意义，即这并不比解决教科书上的逻辑问题需要更多的能力，或者是认为这与人类的满足感对立，诸如是对愉快的情感生活的一种损害。这些关于合理性的观点，其根源来自于人们有限的以及错误的对合理性思维的看法，同时与现代认知科学对合理性的研究不相符合。
Dictionary definitions of rationality tend to be rather lame and unspecific (“the state or quality of being in accord with reason”), and some critics who wish to downplay the importance of rationality have promulgated a caricature of rationality that involves restricting its definition to not more than the ability to do the syllogistic reasoning problems that are encountered in Philosophy 101. The meaning of rationality in modern cognitive science is, in contrast, much more robust and important.
字典对合理性的定义（“合乎理性的状态或性质”）相当蹩脚和不具体，而一些批评家为了贬低这一概念的重要性，于是对其大肆曲解，其中包括窄化定义的范围，将其等同于简单的逻辑推理能力，如同哲学导论（psychology 101）中论述的三段论逻辑推理。相反，现代认知科学中的合理性意义（相比较而言）则更加坚实与重要。
Cognitive scientists recognize two types of rationality: instrumental and epistemic. The simplest definition of instrumental rationality, the one that emphasizes most that it is grounded in the practical world, is: Behaving in the world so that you get exactly what you most want, given the resources (physical and mental) available to you. The other aspect of rationality studied by cognitive scientists is termed epistemic rationality. This aspect of rationality concerns how well beliefs map onto the actual structure of the world. The two types of rationality are related. In order to take actions that fulfill our goals, we need to base those actions on beliefs that are properly calibrated to the world.
认知科学家认可两种类型的合理性：工具合理性（instrumental）与认识合理性（epistemic）。工具合理性有一个最简单的定义：基于可用的（物质与精神的）资源，采取最优的行为方式以满足自己最大的需求，这一定义强调最多的是它建立在实用世界的基础之上。同时，另一种认知科学家所研究的合理性被称为认识合理性，这种合理性关注的是我们的信念如何映现于实在的世界结构。这两种合理性相互联系，为了采取行动以实现目标，我们需要将这些行动建立在信念的基础之上，而同时这些信念要恰好符合现实世界的要求。
Although many people feel (mistakenly or not) that they could do without the ability to solve textbook logic problems (which is why the caricatured view of rationality works to undercut its status), virtually no person wishes to eschew epistemic rationality and instrumental rationality, properly defined. Virtually all people want their beliefs to be in some correspondence with reality, and they also want to act to maximize the achievement of their goals. Psychologist Ken Manktelow has emphasized the practicality of both types of rationality by noting that they concern two critical things: What is true and what to do. Epistemic rationality is about what is true and instrumental rationality is about what to do. For our beliefs to be rational they must correspond to the way the world is—they must be true. For our actions to be rational they must be the best means toward our goals—they must be the best things to do.
尽管很多人觉得（不管这是被误导与否）自己没有解决教科书上逻辑问题的能力也无妨——这也正是合理性的歪曲概念能够削弱其地位的原因所在——但是，人人都愿意接受认识合理性和工具合理性，如果这两个概念被合理定义的话。事实上，所有人都希望他们的信念多少是与现实相符的，同时也希望他们的行为能够最大程度地促进目标的实现。心理学家肯·曼克特洛（Ken Manktelow）强调了这两种合理性的实践性（practicality），说明它们关乎两个关键的问题：什么是对的以及做什么。认识合理性关乎的是什么是对的，而工具合理性关乎的是做什么。我们的信念如果要合理的话，它们就必须符合现实世界的运行方式，即它们必须是真实的。我们的行为如果要合理的话，它们就必须是达成目标的最佳手段，即它们必须是最佳的行为。
Nothing could be more practical or useful for a person’s life than the thinking processes that help them find out what is true and what is best to do. Such a view of rational thinking—as an eminently practical endeavor — stands in marked contrast to some restricted views of what rationality is (for example, the rationality = logic view that I mentioned above).
我们的思维过程帮助我们发现真实以及最佳行为，对于一个人的生活来说没有比这更实际或是有用的了。这样的一种合理性思维观点非常实际，同时也与某些狭隘的观点形成鲜明对比，比如上文中提到的合理性=逻辑这种观点。
The second mistaken view that one often hears is that emotion is antithetical to rationality. The absence of emotion is seen as purifying thinking into purely rational form. This idea is not consistent with the definition of rationality in modern cognitive science. Instrumental rationality is behavior consistent with maximizing goal satisfaction, not a particular psychological process. It is perfectly possible for the emotions to facilitate instrumental rationality as well as to impede it. In fact, conceptions of emotions in cognitive science stress the adaptive regulatory powers of the emotions. The basic idea is that emotions serve to stop the combinatorial explosion of possibilities that would occur if an intelligent system tried to calculate the utility of all possible future outcomes. Emotions are thought to constrain the possibilities to a manageable number based on similar situations in the past.
我们经常听到的第二种错误的看法认为：情绪与合理性是对立的。如果要净化思维为完全的合理性形式，我们就不能掺杂情绪于其中。然而，这种观点与现代认知科学对合理性的定义并不符合。工具合理性是一种行为方式，它符合目标实现的最大化，而情绪完全有可能促进或是妨碍工具合理性。事实上，在认知科学中，情绪这一概念强调的是适应性情绪调控力。这种概念基本的思想认为，情绪的作用在于阻止可能性的组合爆炸（combinatorial explosion of possibilities）。换句话说，当一个智能系统（intelligent system）尝试计算将来所有可能的结果时，情绪被认为可以根据过去类似的情境，将这些可能性限制在一个可以处理的数目之内。
In short, emotions get us “in the right ballpark” of the correct response. If more accuracy than that is required, then a more precise type of analytic cognition will be required. Of course, we can rely too much on the emotions. We can base responses on a “ballpark” solution in situations that really require a more precise type of analytic thought. More often than not, however, processes of emotional regulation facilitate rational thought and action.
简而言之，情绪不至于让我们茫然于所有正确的回应之中无法选择。如果还需要更精确的话，更为周密的分析认知便成了必须。当然，我们可能会太过依赖于情绪，在一个情境中将我们的回应建立在“大致正确”的解决方案上，而实际这种情况需要更为周密的分析思维。然而通常情况是，情绪调控过程有利于合理的思维与行动。
Writer Malcolm Gladwell, in his best-selling book Blink, adopts the folk psychological view of the relation between emotion and rationality that is at odds with the way those concepts are discussed in cognitive science. Gladwell discusses the famous cases of cognitive neuroscientist Antonio Damasio where damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex caused nonfunctional behavior without impairing intelligence. Gladwell argues that “people with damage to their ventromedial area are perfectly rational. They can be highly intelligent and functional, but they lack judgment” (2005, p. 59).
作家马尔科姆·格拉德维尔（Malcolm Gladwell）著有畅销书《闪烁》。在这本著作当中，他采用了普通心理学（folk psychology）关于情绪与合理性关系的观点，然而，他对两者关系的描述与认知科学所探讨的这些概念违逆。格拉德维尔论述了认知神经学家安东尼奥·达马西奥（Antonio Damasio）的著名案例，即腹内侧前额叶皮质（ventromedial prefrontal cortex）的损伤导致行为能力的丧失，但智力没有受到损害。格拉德维尔于是认为“腹内侧部位损伤患者是完全合理的。他们可以有高智商并功能健全，但缺乏判断力。”
This is not the right way to describe these cases. But in the view of modern cognitive science, someone who lacks judgment cannot be rational. According to Gladwell’s lay definition, people in these cases have lost emotion, so they must be rational thinkers. In the view of modern cognitive science, this is not the case. People with ventromedial damage are in fact less rational because their processes of emotional regulation—which work in concert with more analytic cognition to support optimal responding—are deficient. As logic itself is one of many tools of rational thought, so is emotion.
然而对这些病例来说，这种描述并不正确。在现代认知科学的观点看来，缺乏判断力的个体是不可能合理的。根据格拉德维尔下设的定义，这些患者已经失去了情绪的能力，所以他们一定是合理的思考者。但是，从现代认知科学的观点来看却并非如此。腹内侧损伤患者因为情绪调控过程的缺陷，他们实际上（与正常人相比）更不合理，因为这种缺陷导致分析认知能力的下降，进而降低作出最优回应的可能性。正如逻辑是合理性思维的工具之一，情绪也是如此。
译者：草白
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